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I. INTRODUCTION
In Heilman v. Courtney, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a
person convicted of a felony-level Driving While Intoxicated offense (felony DWI)
is “released from prison” under Minnesota statute when he departs from prison to
participate in Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program. The court made
this determination based on the language in the felony-DWI conditional release
statute and the statutes governing the Challenge Incarceration Program. Justice
Lillehaug issued a strong dissent to the majority’s decision, noting that the majority
strayed from the legislative intent behind the aforementioned statutes and other
relevant statutes.
1

2

3

*Claire Gutknecht is a Juris Doctor Candidate for 2021 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
She is a second-year law student working for the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office in the
Adult Prosecution Division. She previously worked at a federal re-entry center, and that
experience spurred her to pursue a career as an attorney and ignited her passion for criminal
justice reform.
Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 396–97 (Minn. 2019) (discussing section
169A.276, subdivision 1(d), and section 244.172, subdivision 2, of the 2018 Minnesota
Statutes and their interplay in determining when a person’s mandatory conditional release
term will begin).
See id. at 404–08 (opinion attachment) (providing Policies, Directives and Instructions
Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017) (promulgating indepth instructions for how the Challenge Incarceration Program should be implemented)).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 400–02 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“The court’s interpretation
makes the statute less effective and uniform. It gives some people convicted of first-degree
1

2

3
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This case note begins with the relevant statutory history and case law
underlying the Heilman decision. Next, it describes the facts, relevant procedural
history, and the court’s ultimate ruling in Heilman. The analysis demonstrates the
court’s error in failing to engage in a complete statutory interpretation. The case
note then engages in a complete statutory analysis to explain what should have
occurred in Heilman. Additionally, the analysis argues that the court’s
determination in Heilman possibly leads to an equal protection violation.

II. CASE LAW AND STATUTORY HISTORY INFORMING THE HEILMAN
DECISION

A. Statutory History
In Minnesota, a fixed executed sentence for a felony-level offense must
“consist[] of two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal
to two-thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum supervised
release term that is equal to one-third of the executed sentence.” If people violate
prison rules or refuse to participate in treatment programs while incarcerated, they
may spend more time imprisoned than the required two-thirds minimum as a
punishment for those violations.
Supervised release occurs after a person completes a term of
imprisonment and is released from prison. The supervised release term must be
equal to the time remaining in a person’s executed sentence after completion of the
minimum term of imprisonment. People cannot spend more than one-third of
their executed sentence on supervised release or in the community because, at
minimum, two-thirds of an executed sentence must be served in prison. While on
supervised release, people must follow certain rules, comply with standards adopted
by the Commissioner of Corrections, and follow rules promulgated by the judicial
official at the time of sentencing. If supervised release terms are violated, people
are subject to sanctions for those violations. Sanctions for supervised release
violations range from a restructuring of supervised release requirements to
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

DWI an early start on their conditional-release terms and disconnects those terms from the
supervised-release terms. This discrepancy undermines the system of mandatory penalties
the Legislature enacted to remedy a serious problem.”).
MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019).
See id.; MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a) (2019); MINN. R. 2940.1600 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1.
Id. subdiv. 1b(a). For example, if a defendant is sentenced to a sixty-month executed
sentence, the defendant would serve two-thirds of that time (forty months) in prison; upon
release, the defendant would spend the remaining one-third of the executed sentence (twenty
months) on supervised release. See id.
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1.
MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 2.
Id. subdiv. 3.
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
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reimprisonment for the remainder of the supervised release term, which is
equivalent to the time remaining in the original executed sentence.
In addition to supervised release, some felony-level offenses in Minnesota
require a mandatory conditional release term. At issue in Heilman was the
statutorily mandated conditional release term for felony DWI offenses. Under this
statute, any person whose prison sentence is executed after a felony DWI
conviction must serve a five-year conditional release term after being released from
prison. Like supervised release, felony DWI conditional release can be revoked
for violations, which results in the person serving all or a portion of the remaining
conditional release term in prison, even if the minimum term of imprisonment has
already been completed. People with felony DWI convictions are mandated by
statute to serve both a five-year conditional release term and the statutorily
mandated supervised release term upon their release from prison.
Conditional release terms are governed by the same provisions as
supervised release terms. Both conditional release and supervised release are types
of community supervision. During this period of supervision, people are required
to abide by the conditions imposed by the state in order to maintain their freedom
from incarceration. The Commissioner of Corrections adopts standards and
procedures for revocation of supervised and conditional release. However, the
imposed conditions under either type of supervision vary on a case-by-case basis.
There are a number of standard conditions of supervised release, including:
reporting to supervising agents after release from prison, maintaining continuous
contact with the supervising agent, abstaining from using intoxicants or drugs, and
11

12
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20

21

Id.; see also State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). The
type of sanctions probationers receive generally depends on the severity of their violation
and whether they have had prior probation violations. There is no right to a formal hearing
to ascertain whether a release violation has occurred prior to receiving a sanction. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019) (mandating a five-year term of
conditional release for persons convicted of felony-level DWI); MINN. STAT. § 609.3455,
subdiv. 6 (2019) (mandating a conditional release term for eligible people convicted of sex
offenses); State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. 2004) (indicating that the language
in the felony DWI statute makes conditional release compulsory in cases where a prison
sentence will be executed).
Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2019).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d); see also Bushey v. State, No. A07-0787, 2008 WL
1868079, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008).
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d).
See MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1 (2019) (mandating convicted persons to serve a
supervised release term not exceeding the length of time remaining on their sentence); MINN.
STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (requiring that people convicted of felony DWI serve a fiveyear term of conditional release).
See MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.276, 244.05 (2019) (providing the requirements of supervised
release).
Cecelia Klingele, Criminal Law: Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1021 (2013).
11
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Id.

MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 2.
Klingele, supra note 18, at 1033–36.
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remaining law-abiding. However, individuals may be subject to more conditions
directly reflecting their individualized needs because the sentencing judge and
Commissioner of Corrections can mandate different conditions.
22

23

B. Work Release and the Challenge Incarceration Program
Prior to release from prison, people may choose to participate in different
programs during their term of incarceration. Two such programs are the Challenge
Incarceration Program (Bootcamp) and the Work Release Program (Work
Release). Bootcamp consists of three phases. Phase I lasts a minimum of 180
days and requires participants to undergo a highly structured and rigorous
bootcamp-like scenario in which targeted and individualized programming must be
completed. Additionally, Phase I must occur at one of the designated Minnesota
Correctional Institutions.
In Phase II, which lasts at least six months, participants depart from prison
to intensely-supervised home confinement, where they must participate in forty
hours of a “pre-approved constructive activity” such as work, school, or
volunteering. This intense supervision includes regular drug testing, daily reporting
to a supervising agent, and any other conditions imposed by the Commissioner of
Corrections. During Phase II, participants can eventually gain privileges like preapproved social activities and visitation.
Phase III, Bootcamp’s final phase, extends until the Commissioner of
Corrections determines the participant has completed Bootcamp successfully or
until the participant’s sentence expires. In Phase III, participants are able to act as
though they are on supervised release, although the formal transfer has not yet
24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

MINN. R. 2940.2000 (2019). Other conditions include informing the supervising agent of
address changes and contact with law enforcement, not possessing firearms or dangerous
weapons, and remaining in the state unless the supervised person has permission to leave.
22

Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 2.
23

MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019) (creating and governing the Challenge Incarceration
Program, which eligible incarcerated persons may elect to participate in with permission from
the Commissioner of Corrections); see also MINN. STAT. § 241.26 (2019) (allowing eligible
incarcerated persons to participate in the Work Release program with permission from the
Commissioner of Corrections).
MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173, 241.26.
MINN. STAT. § 244.172 (describing the various phases in the Challenge Incarceration
Program).
MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 1.
Id. (requiring participants to “be confined at the Minnesota Correctional Facility—Willow
River/Moose Lake or the Minnesota Correctional Facility—Togo” while completing Phase
I).
Id. subdiv. 2; Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 412 (citing Policies, Directives and
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)).
MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 2.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412.
MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 3.
24
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occurred. The participants are no longer under the intensive supervision that is
characteristic of Phase II. Instead, they begin to act like normal parolees.
If a participant completes Phase III successfully, the supervising agent may
apply for an early release, and if the Commissioner of Corrections approves, the
participant may be transferred to supervised release for the remainder of the term
of incarceration. At any time during Phase II or Phase III, participants can be
removed from the program and returned to prison for failing to comply with
program rules.
Work Release allows the Commissioner of Corrections to conditionally
release eligible people to work, seek employment, or participate in vocational or
educational training in the community. Work Release is comparable to Phase II
of Bootcamp, as participants are released to a location pre-approved by the
Commissioner of Corrections. This location could be a halfway house, treatment
facility, or the person’s residence.
Like Bootcamp participants, Work Release participants are required to
abide by certain conditions and rules established by the Commissioner of
Corrections. For example, participants cannot use any mood-altering substances,
must be under close supervision, and provide regular breath and urine samples to
ensure sobriety. Work Release participants must also complete transitional
programs and treatment programs like Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous. Like Bootcamp participants, Work Release participants may
eventually gain access to limited privileges like social passes. However, prior to
obtaining privileges, participants must have followed all program rules and
maintained steady employment. If participants regress or do not comply with
Work Release rules, their privileges may be revoked, and they may be sent back to
prison to complete the remainder of their term of imprisonment.
Both programs are voluntary incarceration programs, meaning, people
must volunteer to participate in the programs rather than being randomly selected
33

34

35

36
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40
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42

43

44

45

33
34

Id.
See id.; Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412–13.

MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 3. Thus, people could be allowed to transfer to supervised
release prior to completing their minimum term of imprisonment, resulting in an early
release. See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019); Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 409, 412–
13.
See MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 3; Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412.
MINN. STAT. § 241.26, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Id. subdiv. 2.
Id. (providing more information about the housing options participants have while on
Work Release).
Id. subdiv. 3.
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., FACT SHEET: WORK RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (2019), https://mn.gov
/doc/assets/Work%20Release_tcm1089-309002.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9J8-W2X8].
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 241.26, subdiv. 3 (2019); MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 41, at 2.
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 41, at 2.
35

36
37
38
39

40
41
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43
44
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Id.
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by the Commissioner of Corrections. Bootcamp participants must have at least
thirteen months remaining in their term of imprisonment. Work Release
participants must have at least twelve months remaining in their term of
imprisonment. Both programs require program staff to screen applications to
determine if the applicant is a good candidate for structured transitional release.
Both programs prevent people with certain characteristics or offenses from
participating in the program. For example, people currently serving time for an
out-of-state sentence and those required to register as predatory offenders are
barred from participating in either program.
46

47

48

49

50

51

C. Common Law History
There are several Minnesota precedents regarding the intersection of
felony DWI conditional release, incarceration programs, and supervised release.
First, in State v. Calmes, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that conditional
release is constitutional and does not constitute multiple punishments for the same
offense; rather, conditional release is a part of the mandated punishment for certain
crimes. In general, conditional release is meant to provide continuous supervision
in the community after a person is released from prison. This is accomplished
because individuals on community-based supervision remain in legal custody of the
state as they are subject to reincarceration for any breach of a release condition,
even after completion of their term of imprisonment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has repeatedly indicated that supervised
release and conditional release can be concurrent to each other if the statutory
language supports a concurrent application of the two. More specifically, in Maiers
52

53

54

55

Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 404–05 (attaching Policies, Directives and
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. Div. Directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017));
Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive
46

205.120(B)(2)
(Dec.
18,
2018)
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/
DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=205.120.htm [https://perma.cc/G4H4-S5D5].
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual,
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 46, div. directive 205.120(B)(1).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 405; see also MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 205.120, supra
note 46.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404; see also MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 46, div. directive
205.120(B)(3).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404; see also MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 46, div. directive
205.120(B)(3)(d),(h).
State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Minn. 2001).
See State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
See State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 276–77 (Minn. 2016); State v. Schwartz,
628 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2001).
Tillotson v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., No. A12-1175, 2013 WL 1788505, at *5 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 29, 2013) (explaining that conditional release and supervised release will
necessarily run concurrently based upon the language in Minnesota Statutes section
169A.276); State ex rel. Peterson v. Fabian, 784 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010)
(explaining that conditional release and supervised release do not run concurrently when
statutory language directs that conditional release begin after the completion of sentences
47

48
49

50

51

52
53
54
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v. Roy, the court explained that people mandated to serve a five-year conditional

release term under the felony DWI statute will serve their supervised release and
conditional release terms concurrently because both supervision terms begin when
a person is released from prison, as indicated by the statutory language.
Additionally, in Pollard v. Roy, the court indicated that a conditional release term
cannot begin prior to release from prison. Furthermore, the court has reinforced
that conditional release terms are compulsory and for a fixed period. In the case
of a felony DWI conviction, the term must be five years.
In Duncan v. Roy, the court extrapolated further, explaining that
participants cannot receive credit towards their conditional release term for time
spent incarcerated if there is a supervised release violation and revocation. This
time cannot be credited towards conditional release, as conditional release and
supervised release are meant to be served in the community; whereas, when people
are revoked from community-supervision, they are in custody.
In Huseby v. Roy, the court determined that a person’s transfer from
prison to Work Release does not constitute a release from prison. Thus, under
the felony DWI statute, a person’s conditional release term is not triggered when
he or she departs from prison to participate in Work Release. The court reached
this decision after an analysis of relevant Minnesota statutes. These statutes
mandate that two-thirds of an executed sentence be served in prison. As such,
when people depart for Work Release, they are still serving their mandated
56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

that are followed by a period of supervised release); State v. Koperski, 611 N.W.2d 569, 572
(Minn. Ct App. 2000) (holding that legislative intent and relevant case law clearly indicate
that supervised release and conditional release terms are to run concurrently), abrogated on
other grounds by State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 349–50 (Minn. Ct. App.
2016); State v. Enger, 539 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that time spent
on supervised release must be subtracted from the conditional release term).
Maiers v. Roy, 847 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014). Note that the court does not
mandate this in every circumstance; rather, holding only that this is the necessary result when
sections 244.05 and 169A.276 of the Minnesota Statutes are read together. Id.
Pollard, 878 N.W.2d at 348 (citing State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003).
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019) (describing the compulsory
nature of the five-year fixed conditional release term for felony DWI).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d).
State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 278–79 (Minn. 2016). In contrast to
Heilman, the petitioner in Duncan was serving time and was mandated to serve on
conditional release for a sex-offense based on the now-obsolete section 609.109, subdivision
7(a), of the Minnesota Statutes. See Duncan, 887 N.W.2d at 272.
See id. at 276–77.
State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). The petitioner
in this case was serving time and was assigned mandatory conditional release under
section 169A.276, subdivision 1(d), of the Minnesota Statutes, making his circumstances
identical to Heilman’s. Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 634.
Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 638; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.276.
Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636.
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019); MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a)
(2019).
56
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minimum term of imprisonment. The court determined that Work Release
participants are still incarcerated even while residing outside of the prison walls.
Given this determination, Work Release participants cannot begin their conditional
release or supervised release terms because they have not been “release[d] from
prison” under the felony DWI statute.
66

67

68

III. CASE SUMMARY

A. Facts and Procedural Posture
On September 13, 2004, Donald Heilman was sentenced to a stayed
fifty-one-month prison sentence, followed by five years of conditional release. As
his sentence was stayed, Heilman was placed on probation. On May 22, 2007, the
State revoked Heilman’s probation and executed his stayed prison sentence,
meaning he was required to serve time in prison. In December 2007, Heilman
opted to participate in Bootcamp and began Phase I.
Heilman completed Phase I of Bootcamp in July 2008, at which point he
departed from the prison to his home to complete Phase II under intensive house
arrest supervision. Heilman completed Phase II in January 2009 and continued
on to Phase III of Bootcamp. However, Heilman failed to remain sober and
regressed back to Phase II in April 2009. Heilman again failed to remain sober
and after a few months was removed from the Bootcamp program altogether and
sent back to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence.
After serving two-thirds of his fifty-one-month sentence, Heilman was
released from prison on December 27, 2010, and began his mandated conditional
and supervised release terms. Heilman was arrested on March 12, 2014, for failing
to complete inpatient chemical dependency treatment, which was a condition of his
supervised release. At a probation hearing on March 25, 2014, Heilman’s
supervised release was revoked for 180 days as a sanction for his failure to complete
69
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74

75

76

77

See Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636–37; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1; MINN.
STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a).
Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 637; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1; MINN. STAT.
§ 244.05, subdiv. 1b(a).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d); Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636–37 (citing MINN.
STAT. §§ 244.05, subdiv. 1, 244.065).
Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2019). Heilman was convicted for
first-degree driving while impaired. Under the statute, Minnesota courts can refrain from
imposing or executing a prison sentence. MINN. STAT. § 609.135, subdiv. 2 (2019).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 390.
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 390.
66

67

68

69

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 391.
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inpatient treatment. The Department of Corrections released Heilman on May
14, 2014, after he served only 63 days of the 180-day sanction. Unfortunately, the
Department of Corrections did not document the purpose for this release.
Heilman filed a complaint in July 2016 against the Department of
Corrections, asserting false imprisonment and negligence claims. Heilman
claimed his five-year conditional release term under the felony DWI statute began
when he left prison to begin Phase II of Bootcamp on July 9, 2008. Heilman
believed his five-year conditional release term should have expired in July 2013.
Therefore, Heilman argued that the sixty-three days he served as a sanction from
March 2014 to May 2014 constituted unlawful incarceration.
The district court granted the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
and dismissed Heilman’s claims with prejudice as he had failed to establish that the
Department of Corrections intentionally caused his confinement beyond his release
date or that it owed him a duty. Furthermore, the court found the Department of
Corrections was justified in incarcerating Heilman, which is a valid defense to false
imprisonment, absolving the Department of Corrections from any guilt.
Heilman appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s decision as it determined that Heilman’s conditional release was
properly revoked. The court also addressed the meaning of “released from
prison,” explaining that when a person is released from prison after completing
Phase I of Bootcamp, he or she is not released from custody. Furthermore, the
court indicated that conditional release and supervised release are both mandated
to begin at the time a person is released from prison. Thus, because Heilman’s
supervised release began in December 2010 when he was released after serving twothirds of his executed fifty-one-month sentence, he would remain on conditional
release until December 2015. Heilman petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court
for review, which was granted.
78
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91

Id. Inpatient treatment was one of the required conditions of Heilman’s supervised release,
violation of which allowed the revocation of such release. See id.

78

Id.
Id. Justice Thissen’s dissent noted that the failure to record the purpose of release was
alarming for a multitude of reasons. Id. at 402–03 (Thissen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“The court first reclassified the district court’s order as a grant of summary judgment

79
80

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

because the parties relied on documents outside the pleadings.” (citing Heilman v. Courtney,
906 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017))).
Heilman, 906 N.W.2d at 525. This determination was based on the interplay of section
169A.276, subdivision 1(d) and section 244.172, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes.
Heilman, 906 N.W.2d at 525–26; see also Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 636–38.
Heilman, 906 N.W.2d at 526.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 392. Heilman argued that the appellate court, in addition to its
misinterpretation, had inappropriately reviewed the statute—an issue that had not been raised
in district court. Id.
88

89
90
91
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B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision and Reasoning
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Heilman argued that his claims
should not have been dismissed. The court addressed two issues: (1) whether the
court of appeals erred when it engaged in statutory interpretation; and (2) whether
a person convicted of a DWI is released from prison under the felony DWI statute
when he or she begins Phase II of Bootcamp. This case note focuses on the
supreme court’s determination that conditional release begins when Phase II of
Bootcamp begins.
The court reviewed the appellate court’s statutory interpretation analysis
de novo. It began by explaining that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to
determine and fulfill the legislative intent behind the statute. If legislative intent is
based on plain meaning, then the statute should be interpreted according to plain
meaning.
The court looked at a series of statutes and determined that the language
in the statutory scheme does not mandate for conditional release and supervised
release to begin simultaneously, meaning the two types of release do not have to
run concurrently. To arrive at this conclusion, the court relied on Duncan v. Roy,
which held that the plain meaning of the word “release” is “to [be] set free from
confinement or bondage.” The court adopted this same definition of “release” in
the felony DWI statute such that an individual who is “set free” from prison begins
conditional release at that point. Heilman’s departure for Phase II of Bootcamp
was considered a release from prison as he was “set free” from prison. Thus,
Heilman’s conditional release term began when he was released from prison to
begin Phase II of Bootcamp in July 2008, meaning his term of imprisonment
should have expired in July 2013.
The court believed this interpretation was supported by Bootcamp’s
structure because Phase I requires confinement, but Phase II must expressly take
place in the community. In Phase II, participants are not confined despite the
92

93
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95

96

97

98
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100

101

102

103

92
93

Id.
Id. The court addressed this first issue regarding Heilman’s argument that the appellate

court had inappropriately engaged in statutory interpretation when that issue had not been
raised in district court. Id. The court ultimately determined the court of appeals had not
erred because even though Heilman did not cite to the statute, it was the primary source of
his argument in district court and the State had cited to the statute in its response to
Heilman’s argument. Id. Thus, the issue was properly before both the court of appeals and
the present court. Id.
Id. at 397–98; MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 393.
Id. at 394.
Id.; MINN. STAT. § 645.16.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394–96 (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019);
MINN. STAT. §§ 244.171–.173 (2019)).
Id. at 394 (citing State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 2016)).
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95
96
97
98

99

100
101
102
103

Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 390, 395.
Id. at 395.
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intense supervised release. Thus, while in Phase II, participants are released from
prison because they have been “set free from confinement or bondage.”
The court offered three pieces of evidence to bolster its decision. First,
the court referred to the Department of Corrections’ paperwork reflecting
Heilman’s conditional release revocation in September 2009, which clearly showed
that his conditional release began prior to the completion of his term of
imprisonment in December 2010. Second, the court explained that Bootcamp is
an exception from the general statutory scheme and legislative mandate, allowing
for release to occur before the completion of a person’s sentence. Third, the court
indicated that Bootcamp is voluntary and requires people to sign contracts to opt
into the program. Thus, the incentive and benefit people receive for participation
in Bootcamp is the potential of an early release from prison. The court believed
this provided support for the premise that conditional release would begin when a
participant is released for Phase II because this would constitute an early release.
Justice Lillehaug issued a persuasive dissent. He argued that the majority’s
plain-meaning interpretation of the phrase “release from prison” was inappropriate
because the phrase is ambiguous. Thus, according to Justice Lillehaug, the
majority should have engaged in a complete statutory interpretation analysis. He
reasoned that, after a full statutory interpretation analysis, the court likely would
have concluded that the court of appeals’ interpretation of the phrase was the most
persuasive because it most fully embodied the legislative intent.
104

105
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107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

IV. ANALYSIS
The Heilman court came to the incorrect conclusion because it failed to
engage in a complete statutory analysis given the ambiguity in the statute. Had the
court engaged in this analysis, the surrounding statutes, case law, and policies would
have led the court to conclude that supervised release should not begin when a
Bootcamp participant leaves for Phase II of Bootcamp. Moreover, the court’s
104
105
106
107

Id.
Id. at 394–95 (citing State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 2016)).
Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 397 (“That the Department revoked Heilman’s ‘conditional release’ in 2009 implies

that Heilman did not begin his conditional-release term in 2010 . . . . That which has not yet
begun cannot be revoked.”).
Id. at 397–98. (“As Heilman persuasively points out, ‘that’s the point of the [Bootcamp]—
an early release from prison before the term of imprisonment has expired.’ Presumably,
felons understand this advantage, which is why they voluntarily choose to participate in the
Program and its boot camp.”).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 397–98.
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 1(a) (2019).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 400 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
Id. at 401 (“If a statute is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is
ambiguous[,] and we may resort to the canons of construction or legislative history to
determine the intent of the Legislature.” (quoting State ex. rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d
271, 276 (Minn. 2016))).
Id. at 401–02.
108

109
110
111
112
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decision in Heilman creates a plausible equal protection violation because it creates
a circumstance where similarly situated persons are treated in an unequal manner.

A. Statutory Interpretation Analysis
The central point of contention in Heilman v. Courtney was how
the phrase “released from prison” within the felony DWI statute should be
interpreted as applied to Heilman’s circumstances. 115 Statutory
interpretation is a task courts are well-equipped to perform and one they
engage in regularly. 116 Proper statutory interpretation is imperative because
courts have the duty to effectuate legislative intent when determining what
behavior to criminalize and which punishments to apply. 117
Heilman and the State provided different opinions on how the
phrase “release from prison” should be interpreted. 118 Heilman believed a
person’s departure from prison as a part of Bootcamp fell within the
statutory meaning of “released from prison.” 119 The State argued that the
statute was ambiguous and needed to be interpreted to determine how it
should apply to Bootcamp participants. 120 Nonetheless, the court engaged in
surface-level statutory interpretation to determine how the phrase “release
from prison” should be defined and applied to Heilman’s circumstances. 121

1. Process Courts Utilize to Perform Statutory Interpretation and the
Purpose of Statutory Interpretation
Minnesota has a network of statutes and case law that provide
guidance on how courts should approach statutory interpretation issues.
Statutory interpretation questions are resolved using the de novo standard

Id. at 389. This interpretation was necessary to determine when Heilman’s conditional
release term started because the felony DWI statute mandates conditional release to begin
upon a person’s “release from prison.” Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2018)).
Courts regularly engage in statutory interpretation as the American system mandates
separation of powers, meaning legislatures make and pass laws and courts authoritatively
interpret those laws. SHAMBIE SINGER & NORMAN J. SINGER, The Function of Interpretation,
in SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:3 (7th ed. 2019); see also
State v. Meyer, 37 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Minn. 1949) (indicating the legislature has always had the
power to fix and determine the punishments that should be imposed for violations of the
law); State v. Miller, No. 02-CR-15-3913, 2017 WL 2729608, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26,
2017) (“The legislature is vested with power to define criminal conduct and to determine the
punishment for such conduct.” (citing State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17–18 (Minn. 1982))).
See Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 17–18; SINGER & SINGER, supra note 116.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 393.
Id. During Phase II of the Bootcamp, participants reside in the community under house
arrest and intense supervision. MINN. STAT. §§ 244.171–.173 (2019).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 393.
Id. at 394.
115

116

117
118
119

120
121

2020]

CASE NOTE: HEILMAN V. COURTNEY

821

of review. 122 The central purpose of all statutory interpretation is to
“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 123
With the central purpose of effectuating the intent of the legislature,
“[t]he first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute
is ambiguous on its face.” 124 “A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” 125 Courts
can “assume that the legislature enacts statutes ‘with full knowledge of prior
legislation on the same subject.’” 126 Multiple parts of a statute can be read in
conjunction to determine ambiguity. 127 This is a necessary first step because,
if legislative intent is discernible based on a statute’s unambiguous language,
courts must apply the statute’s plain meaning and no further interpretation
is necessary. 128 Alternatively, if a court concludes statutory language is
ambiguous, it should conduct a complete statutory interpretation analysis. 129
When interpreting a statute, courts must consider “other laws on
the same subject, the purpose of the law, the consequences of a particular
interpretation, and administrative and legislative interpretations of the
statute.” 130 The presumption is that the legislature does not intend an absurd
result in the enforcement of a statute. 131 Statutes must be construed in their
entirety to give effect to all of their provisions. 132 They must be considered
in totality because reading a statute in isolation can lead to absurd results
unintended by the legislature. 133 “Moreover, courts should give a reasonable
and sensible construction to criminal statutes.” 134 Words and phrases should
be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meanings. 135
Additionally, “no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous,
See State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 2016) (indicating that statutory
interpretation is a question of law that the court reviews de novo).
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).
State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014).

122

123
124
125

Id.

State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Meister v. W. Nat. Mut.
Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. 1992)).
Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. 2013); Martin v. Dicklich, 823
N.W.2d 336, 344 (Minn. 2012).
See Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535 (“When the Legislature’s intent is discernible from plain
and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted; and
courts apply the statute’s plain meaning.”).
Henke, 831 N.W.2d at 537; State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009).
State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 645.16 (2016)).
MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2019).
Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535.
State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing MINN.
STAT. §§ 645.08, 645.16, 645.17 (2016)).
State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1996) (citing State v. Suess, 52 N.W.2d
409, 415 (Minn. 1952)).
Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535.
126

127

128
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130

131
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135
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void or insignificant” in the final interpretation of a statute. 136 If the terms
within a statute are not defined by the statute itself, the court can consider
other statutes relating to the same subject matter. 137
Statutes from various chapters may need to be interpreted together
based on the doctrine of in pari materia, which “is a tool of statutory
interpretation that allows two statutes with common purposes and subject
matter to be construed together to determine the meaning of ambiguous
statutory language.” 138 If a court has previously interpreted a statute, the past
interpretation can guide courts in future interpretation of the same statute
or language. 139 Additionally, “an agency’s interpretation of the statutes it
administers is entitled to deference and should be upheld, absent a finding
that it conflicts with the express purpose of the Act and the intention of the
legislature.” 140

2. The Court’s Statutory Interpretation in Heilman Was Incomplete
and Produced a Result Incongruent with the Legislative Intent
In Heilman, the court determined the felony DWI statute and the
phrase “release from prison” contained therein were not ambiguous. 141 The
court resorted to the statute’s plain meaning and determined that a person’s
“release from prison” under the felony DWI statute is triggered if the
person departs from prison for Phase II of Bootcamp. 142

a. The Statutory Phrase “Release from Prison” is Ambiguous as It
Is Reasonably Subject to More Than One Interpretation
The court’s interpretation of “release from prison” is problematic
because it ignores both the legislative intent and the phrase’s reasonable
susceptibility to more than one interpretation. The court’s duty during all
phases of statutory interpretation must be to “ascertain and effectuate the
Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 537, 538 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Amaral v. Saint
Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)).
Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261 (Minn. 1953)).
State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Lucas, 589 N.W.2d
91, 94 (Minn. 1999)).
Henke, 831 N.W.2d at 538.
Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Geo. A.
Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1988)); see also Green v. Whirlpool
Corp., 389 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn. 1986) (stating that “administrative agencies may adopt
regulations to implement or make specific the language of a statute” as long as they do not
“adopt a conflicting rule”); Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372 (stating that courts may “accord
substantial consideration” to the interpretations by the agencies).
Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 397–98 (Minn. 2019).
Id. at 394–98.
136

137

138

139
140

141
142
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intention of the legislature.” 143 This must be the chief purpose even during
the first step of statutory interpretation, which requires determining if a
statute’s language is ambiguous. 144
As outlined in Justice Lillehaug’s dissent, there are two reasonable
interpretations of the phrase “release from prison” as found in the felony
DWI statute. 145 The first defines “release from prison” as the point at which
a person is no longer housed within the walls of a Minnesota correctional
institution. 146 The second reasonable interpretation of “released from
prison” is the point at which people complete their mandated “term of
imprisonment.” 147
In Minnesota, the phrase “term of imprisonment” is defined by
statute and refers to two-thirds of a person’s executed prison sentence. 148
People are mandated to spend this time in custody if they are sentenced on
a felony-level offense. 149 This interpretation is reasonable, as courts can
assume that the legislature enacts statutes with knowledge of prior
legislation. 150 Thus, when the legislature passed the felony DWI statute, it
did so with the knowledge that all people convicted of felony DWIs are
mandated to serve two-thirds of their executed sentence in prison. 151 This
knowledge should inform the interpretation of “release from prison” as it
was known to the legislature. Additionally, sections 169A.276 and 244.101,
subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes can be reviewed in tandem to
determine if an ambiguity exists. 152
Based on these premises, the phrase “release from prison” could
reasonably refer to either (1) when a person is no longer confined to a
Minnesota correctional institution, or (2) the point at which a person has
completed the mandated term of imprisonment. Because these two
conflicting but reasonable interpretations exist, the phrase “release from
prison” in the felony DWI statute is inescapably subject to two meanings,
rendering the statute ambiguous. 153
Furthermore, the overall result of Heilman’s statutory
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).

See id.; SINGER & SINGER, supra note 116.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 401.
Id.
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1.

Id.
See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Meister v. W. Nat’l

Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. 1992)).
See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1.
See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 532 (Minn. 2013); Martin v. Dicklich, 823
N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 2012).
See State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d
303, 307 (Minn. 2012)).
151
152

153
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interpretation is absurd. The Heilman interpretation, as applied to
Heilman’s circumstances, means that while Heilman was serving the
remainder of his prison term after failing out of Bootcamp, he was earning
time credited towards his conditional release term. 154 The court determined,
in Duncan v. Roy, that time spent incarcerated for a supervised release
violation cannot count towards a person’s conditional release term because
conditional release is meant to be served in the community. 155 Thus, the
Heilman decision creates an irrational result where a person is receiving
credit towards a conditional release term while incarcerated and not in the
community, as is required for conditional release. 156
Due to the statute’s inescapable ambiguity, the court should have
conducted a comprehensive statutory interpretation analysis, considering
factors such as other laws on the same subject, the purpose of the law, the
consequences of a particular interpretation, and administrative and
legislative interpretations of the statute. 157 The court also should have
reviewed previous interpretations of the relevant statutes and any relevant
administrative interpretations provided by the Department of Corrections,
the party responsible for calculating the start date of conditional release. 158
Outlined next is the statutory analysis the court should have completed in
Heilman.

b. Determining and Effectuating the Legislative Intent Behind the
Phrase “Release from Prison” Through an Examination of
Other Relevant Statutes and Legislation
To effectuate the intent of the legislature through statutory
interpretation, the court should have considered other laws on the same
subject, the purpose of the law, the consequences of a particular
Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 394–97 (Minn. 2019).
State ex. rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 278–79 n.8 (Minn. 2016).
See id. While the court declined to directly address whether a person may receive credit
for time spent incarcerated during a supervised-release term, its holding, coupled with the
newly adopted definition of “released from prison,” essentially requires people to serve their
conditional release period in the community. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2019)
(instructing courts to presume that the legislature does not intend for absurd results when
passing legislation).
See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).
See Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Minn. 2008) (applying the
Department of Human Rights’ interpretation of a statutory amendment as support for the
interpretation of the statute under Minnesota law); Green v. Whirlpool Corp., 389 N.W.2d
504, 506 (Minn. 1986) (stating that “administrative agencies may adopt regulations to
implement or make specific the language of a statute” as long as they do not “adopt a
conflicting rule”); Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2008) (indicating courts can give “substantial consideration to administrative
interpretations by the responsible agency” when attempting to ascertain the meaning behind
statutory language).
154
155
156

157
158
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interpretation, and administrative and legislative interpretations of the
statute. 159 The relevant statutes to consider here include: the felony DWI
statute mandating a five-year conditional release term for all people
convicted of a felony DWI; 160 the statute providing guidelines for any felonylevel sentence; 161 the series of statutes governing Bootcamp; 162 the statute
governing Work Release; 163 and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 164
Like the statutes interpreted in State v. Leathers, Chapters 169 and
244 of the Minnesota Statutes are related and should be interpreted
together. 165 Chapter 244 governs sentencing for all felony-level offenses,
including the offenses enumerated in Chapter 169 of the Minnesota
Statutes. 166 The phrase “release from prison” in the felony DWI statute
should be construed in conjunction with section 244.01 because they are in
pari materia.
Chapter 244.101 explains that a felony sentence must “consist[] of
two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to
two-thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum
supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the executed
sentence.” 167 Thus, it is logical for the phrase “release from prison” to refer
to a person’s release from confinement after completion of the mandated
minimum term of imprisonment. 168 This interpretation is supported by
Huseby v. Roy, where the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that departing
prison for Work Release is not a “release from prison” because construing
the departure as a release would allow people to be “release[d] from prison”
before completing the required minimum term of imprisonment. 169
As previously stated, in Minnesota, a fixed executed sentence for a
felony-level offense requires “a specified maximum supervised release term

159
160
161

See MINN. STAT. § 645.16.

MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019).

See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019).

MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 241.26 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5(2) (2019) (providing the purpose behind the sentencing
guidelines).
See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that chapters 244
and 609 of the Minnesota statutes are interrelated and should be interpreted in light of each
other).
See id. Chapter 169 provides more detailed direction on sentencing people convicted of
felony DWIs. MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Id.; MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (applying the phrase “release[d] from prison” to people
convicted of felony DWI).
State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637, 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing
MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1 (2017)) (requiring a minimum of two-thirds of a person’s
executed sentence to be served in prison).
162
163
164

165

166

167
168

169
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that is equal to one-third of the executed sentence.” 170 The statutory language
makes it clear that a person cannot serve more than one-third of an executed
sentence in the community on supervised release. 171
The court’s decision in Heilman allows conditional release terms
for some people to begin early because conditional release can start before
the completion of the minimum term of imprisonment. 172 This decision
defies legislative intent because it leads to an absurd result by allowing a
portion of the Minnesota Statute to become ineffective and uncertain. 173 It
renders section 244.101, subdivision 1(d), of the Minnesota Statutes
ineffective and its application uncertain because Bootcamp participants
convicted of felony DWI need not serve the mandated minimum term of
imprisonment—they can be “release[d] from prison” before serving twothirds of their executed sentence. This creates an absurd circumstance in
which section 244.101 of the Minnesota Statutes no longer applies to a
group of people convicted of felonies, specifically those convicted of felony
DWI and participating in Bootcamp.
Additionally, the Heilman decision disregards the legislative intent
in providing sentencing guidelines and mandating conditional release for
certain offenses. 174 The purpose of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “is
to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards that promote public
safety, reduce sentencing disparities, and ensure that the sanctions imposed
for felony convictions are proportional to the severity of the convicted
offense and the offender's criminal history.” 175 Thus, the legislature intends
criminal sentences to be promulgated in a consistent and fair manner. 176
Furthermore, to encourage successful reentry into society,
conditional release statutes are meant to provide people with close
supervision by the Commissioner of Corrections after being released from
170
171

MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1.

Id.

Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 396–97 (Minn. 2019); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (indicating that conditional release begins after a person convicted
of felony DWI is released from prison); MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 1b (2019) (requiring
two-thirds of an executed felony sentence to be served in prison); State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy,
878 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that allowing an a person to receive
credit towards a supervised release term while in custody would be absurd).
See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1)–(2) (2019) (stating the legislature does not intend for an
absurd result in passing legislation and that the legislature intends all parts of a statute to be
effective and certain).
See MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5 (2019); State ex rel. Ward v. Roy, No. A15–1475,
2016 WL 3375989, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2016) (providing information on the
general intent behind conditional release statutes); Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining the general intent behind conditional release statutes).
About MSGC, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, https://mn.gov/sentencingguidelines/about/ [https://perma.cc/WMJ6-G3B3].
172

173

174

175

176

Id.
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prison. 177 Conditional release statutes accomplish this by mandating
supervision in the community for a fixed period that is not subject to
fluctuation on a person-to-person basis. 178 The felony DWI statute
specifically provides for a five-year conditional release term to be applied to
all people convicted of felony DWI. 179 This sanction should be applied to
all people convicted of felony DWIs in a fair and consistent manner
pursuant to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 180
Contrary to these legislative purposes, the court’s decision in
Heilman allows some people convicted of felony DWI to begin their
conditional release terms early by allowing conditional release to begin when
a person departs for Phase II of Bootcamp. 181 Instead of preventing
disparities in sentencing, the court in Heilman created disparities by
allowing Bootcamp participants convicted of felony DWIs to be treated
differently than all other people convicted of that same offense. 182
This judicially created disparity is evident when sentencing
circumstances and Bootcamp requirements are considered for people
convicted of felony DWI. Bootcamp participants must have a minimum of
thirteen months remaining in their term of imprisonment to be eligible for
Bootcamp. 183 Participants spend six months in Phase I of Bootcamp before
they are eligible to depart for Phase II, which triggers the start of their
conditional release according to the Heilman court. 184 This means that
Bootcamp participants convicted of felony DWI can begin their conditional
release term seven months before their counterparts who are not involved
in Bootcamp. 185
However, the maximum sentence for a first-degree DWI is a total
of seven years, making the minimum term of imprisonment fifty-six
months. 186 Thus, it is plausible that someone sentenced to the statutory
Miller, 714 N.W.2d at 748 (specifically referencing the conditional release statute in
section 609.109, subdivision 7(b), of the 1998 Minnesota Statutes to provide that concepts
regarding the statute’s intent apply to conditional release generally).
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019); State v. Ward, 847 N.W.2d 29, 34
(Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the legislature intended conditional release to allow for
supervision of a person recently released from confinement for a fixed period of time after
he or she returns to the community).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (emphasis added).
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019) (indicating
the Sentencing Guidelines are meant to establish rational and consistent sentencing standard
that reduce disparity).
Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019).
See id.; MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5 (2019).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual,
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017))
Id. at 394, 404.
177

178

179
180

181
182
183

184
185
186

Id.

MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.24, subdiv. 2, 244.05, subdiv. 1b (2019).
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maximum for first-degree felony DWI could begin Bootcamp immediately
after arriving in prison and could be eligible for Phase II with fifty months—
over four years—remaining in his or her sentence. 187 This effectively begins
the mandated conditional release term fifty months earlier than people
convicted of felony DWI who do not participate in Bootcamp. 188
This result frustrates the legislative purpose of encouraging
successful reentry into society through close supervision of people convicted
of felony DWIs. 189 By the time felony DWI Bootcamp participants
complete their minimum term of imprisonment, they will have already
completed fifty months of their mandated conditional release term, which
is only sixty months long. 190
The disparity the court created is even more apparent given that
people convicted of felony DWI who participate in Work Release are not
“release[d] from prison” under the felony DWI statute, despite the
similarities between Work Release and Bootcamp. 191 Clearly, this is not the
legislature’s intent as it creates significant disparities in the application of
criminal sentences, which directly contradicts the stated purpose of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 192
Furthermore, the Heilman decision does not fulfill the purpose of
conditional release statutes because it creates a circumstance where a person
no longer has an extended term of community supervision after completing
an executed sentence. 193 Given the relevant laws, purposes of those laws, and
187
188
189

See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019).
See id.
See Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that

conditional release functions as an additional term of supervision allowing former prisoners
to be under close supervision to promote successful reentry).
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2019).
See State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“The
DOC’s interpretation of work release as not constituting a ‘release from prison,’ so as to
trigger the start of the five-year conditional release term under section 169A.276, subdivision
1(d), maintains consistency and continuity between these related release statutes.”); State ex
rel. Weyaus v. Roy, No. A17-1082, 2017 WL 4478229, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2017)
(reiterating that persons convicted of felony DWI are not “released from prison” so as to
trigger the commencement of their mandated conditional release when they depart from
prison to participate in Work Release). The Heilman court also noted that its decision did
not apply to Work Release participants. Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 396 (Minn.
2019).
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019)
(indicating the Sentencing Guidelines are meant to establish rational and consistent
sentencing standard that reduce disparity).
See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (Minn. 2019) (allowing conditional release to commence
when a person departs for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program). But see State
v. Ward, 847 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (suggesting people should not receive
credit towards their conditional release time for time spent in custody because it would
render the statutes absurd).
190
191

192

193
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the consequences of the Heilman decision, it is apparent the court did not
act according to legislative intent. 194

See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (allowing people to begin conditional release when they
begin Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program despite not having completed the
mandatory two-thirds incarceration term).
194
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c. Determining and Effectuating the Legislative Intent Behind the
Phrase “Release from Prison” in the Felony DWI Statute
Through an Examination of Prior Interpretations of Relevant
Statutes and Ambiguous Terms
If a court has previously interpreted a statute, that interpretation can
guide courts in future interpretations of the same statute or language. 195
While the Minnesota Supreme Court has not interpreted “release from
prison,” as used in section 169A.276 of the Minnesota Statutes, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has interpreted this phrase and other relevant
statutes. 196 These court of appeals’ cases provide insight on how to carry out
the statutory interpretation at issue in Heilman.
In Huseby v. Roy, the defendant, Huseby, was incarcerated after a
felony DWI conviction under section 169A.276 of the Minnesota
Statutes. 197 Huseby opted to participate in Work Release while
incarcerated. 198 He argued that when he left the prison to participate in
Work Release, he was “release[d] from prison,” which triggered the start of
his mandated five-year conditional release term. 199 Conversely, the
Department of Corrections argued that “Work Release is an extension of
confinement, not a release from confinement.” 200
The Huseby court indicated that people “must serve a minimum
term of imprisonment equal to two-thirds of their sentence before they are
eligible for supervised release.” 201 Furthermore, the court determined that
because the Department of Corrections is authorized to allow incarcerated
people to participate in Work Release after completing only half of their
term of imprisonment, incarcerated people “may be eligible to participate
in Work Release while still serving some portion of the term of
imprisonment.” 202 Thus, conditional release could not be triggered by
departure for Work Release. 203
The Huseby court considered the language in the Work Release
195
196

Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Minn. 2013).

See State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining

that a person convicted of felony DWI is not “released from prison” for the purposes of
triggering the commencement of conditional release when they depart from prison to
participate in Work Release); Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367,
372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that an individual on electric home monitoring is still
considered incarcerated and not released under Minnesota Statute section 169A.276,
meaning they are unable to collect unemployment while on electric home monitoring).
Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 634.

197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id.
Id. at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 637.
See id.
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statute to support its interpretation of Work Release to be an extension of
incarceration. 204 For example, the statutory language indicates that the
Commissioner of Corrections must approve a person’s proposed residence
while on Work Release. 205 Additionally, the Work Release statutes refer to
participants as inmates. 206 Participants are treated like inmates insofar as a
failure to return from planned employment while on Work Release could
result in a charge for an escape from confinement. 207 Thus, if Work Release
participants were “released from prison,” the language indicating that Work
Release is an extension of confinement, that participants are still considered
inmates, and that participants can be charged with escape, would all have no
meaning or effect—thereby rendering it “superfluous, void or
insignificant.” 208
Moreover, if departing for Work Release constitutes a “release
from prison,” incarcerated people would not be able to serve the mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment because they would be released from
prison prior to completing two-thirds of their original, executed sentence. 209
For those reasons, the Huseby court adopted the Department of
Corrections’ interpretation that Work Release does not constitute a “release
from prison” triggering the start of a person’s mandated conditional
release. 210
The court additionally stated:
[T]he DOC’s interpretation recognizes that while some work
release programs have no bars or restraints, an inmate is still
confined and does not enjoy the same level of freedom as that
experienced on supervised release. Appellant was confined to
Bethel when not performing approved work, seeking work, or
participating in educational/vocational activities; he was allowed
to leave the confinement only if granted a furlough; and his
options for work release and confinement are designated by the
commissioner. He was further subject to disciplinary regulations
that govern the conduct of incarcerated inmates and he was
prohibited from engaging in escape behavior. 211
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Rushton v. State, 889 N.W.2d 561, 564 (2017)).
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subdiv. 1(2017)).
Id. (explaining that the court’s decision and interpretation maintains consistency and
continuity between the related statutes); see also State ex rel. Weyaus v. Roy, No. A17-1082,
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

2017 WL 4478229, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2017) (reiterating that people convicted of
felony DWI are not “released from prison” when they depart from prison to participate in
Work Release).
Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 637–38 (internal citations omitted).
211
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The criteria the court used in Huseby to determine a person is not
“release[d] from prison” when departing for Work Release is also
applicable to Bootcamp. 212 Like Work Release, people who reside at home
while in Phase II of Bootcamp do not enjoy the same level of freedom that
non-incarcerated people on supervised release enjoy. 213 Bootcamp
participants, like Work Release participants, are subject to intense
supervision during Phase II, including regular drug testing, daily reporting
to the supervising agent, forced access to their home by a supervising agent,
and any other conditions imposed by the Commissioner of Corrections. 214
Both Bootcamp and Work Release participants must obtain permission
from a supervising agent for all activities outside the home 215 and cannot
receive visitors without the permission of a supervising agent. 216 Additionally,
if Bootcamp participants fail to uphold their assigned obligations while
residing at home during Phase II, they can be sent back to prison or
terminated from Bootcamp as a sanction, in the same manner Work
Release participants can be violated. 217
The operational similarities between Bootcamp and Work Release
necessitate an identical interpretation of the phrase “release from prison.” 218
The need for continuity and consistency within statutes applies just as fully
to Bootcamp and the felony DWI statute as it does to Work Release and
the felony DWI statute because the same concerns about people being
released before completion of the mandated minimum term of
imprisonment apply. 219
Additionally, in Carlson v. Department of Employment and
Economic Development, the Minnesota Court of Appeals defined
See id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 244.17–.173 (2019); Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d
387, 404–13 (defining and instructing the actual promulgation of the Challenge Incarceration
Program by providing directive for Department of Corrections Employees and providing
more specific guidelines for Phases II and III of the Challenge Incarceration Program).
MINN. STAT. § 244.172, subdiv. 2 (indicating Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration
Program is intensive supervised release imposing significant requirements on participants).
Id.; see also Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412–13 (attaching Policies, Directives and
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T CORR. div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 412.
212

213

214

215

Id.
Id.
See State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (concluding
Work Release does not constitute a release from prison that triggers conditional release); see
also MINN. STAT. § 244.101 (2019) (mandating people convicted of a crime to serve a
216
217
218

minimum of two-thirds of an executed prison sentence in custody); MINN. STAT. § 169A.276
(2019) (imposing a mandatory five-year conditional release term on all felony DWI
convictions).
See Huseby, 903 N.W.2d at 638 (explaining people on Work Release are not released
under the felony DWI statute because of all the restrictions that apply while on Work
Release).
219

2020]

CASE NOTE: HEILMAN V. COURTNEY

833

“incarceration” as “[t]he act or process of confining someone” and
“confinement” is “the state of being imprisoned or restrained.” 220
Incarceration is dependent on restraint and confinement rather than the
nature of the location where the restraint and confinement occur. 221 “House
arrest” is defined as “confinement of a person . . . to his or her home.” 222
Thus, the court concluded that individuals on house arrest are still
considered incarcerated despite residing outside of a correctional
institution. 223
As Bootcamp participants in Phase II can be on house arrest
through electronic monitoring, they are considered confined and restrained
and, therefore, incarcerated. 224 If a person is incarcerated, he or she has not
yet been “released from prison.” 225 The court, in Heilman v. Courtney,
neglected to consider pertinent decisions already made by different courts,
even though doing so is encouraged in statutory interpretation. 226

d. Determining and Effectuating the Legislative Intent Behind the
Phrase “Release from Prison” in the Felony DWI Statute
Through an Examination of Department of Corrections
Policies and Directives
“[A]n agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers is entitled
to deference and should be upheld, absent a finding that it is in conflict with
the express purpose of the Act and the intention of the legislature.” 227 The
Department of Corrections’ policies on Bootcamp make clear that
Bootcamp participants are incarcerated. 228 First, participants must have a
Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Incarceration, Confinement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372.
Id. (quoting House Arrest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
Id. at 374.
See id.; Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 412–13 (attaching Policies, Directives and
Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T CORR. div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)).
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2019) (containing the phrase “release[ed] from prison”);
Incarceration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (Minn. 2019) (providing that conditional release
commences when a person departs prison for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration
Program). But see Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Minn. 2013) (indicating
prior interpretations of a statute should guide the court in future interpretations); State ex rel.
Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that a departure
for Work Release does not constitute a release from prison because doing so would eliminate
consistency and continuity between various release statutes); Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372
(determining a person is incarcerated while subject to electric home monitoring).
Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Geo. A.
Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1988)).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual,
MINN. DEP’T CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).
220

221
222
223
224

225
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minimum of thirteen months left in their term of imprisonment to be
eligible for Bootcamp, indicating that participants are still incarcerated. 229
Next, the Department’s policies have a provision explaining that a
participant can apply for early release to supervised release after completion
of Phase III of Bootcamp, implying that a participant is not released before
completing Phase III. 230 Moreover, the criteria for early release is strict—it
requires that the applicant has not had any violations in Phase II or Phase
III of Bootcamp. 231 These policies indicate that the Department of
Corrections does not consider participants to be “released from prison”
while completing Phases II and III of Bootcamp. As such, the court’s
decision in Heilman is contrary to Department policy, which was created to
effectuate legislative intent. 232
The Department of Corrections promulgated a new policy in July
2019. 233 This new policy mandates Bootcamp participants to complete their
minimum terms of imprisonment to be eligible to move to Phase II, which
allows them to serve the remainder of their sentence in the community. 234
This change effectively counteracts the court’s decision in Heilman because
it prevents the trigger of conditional release before a person has completed,
at a minimum, two-thirds of his or her mandated term of imprisonment. 235
Such a contradiction indicates the Department’s belief is that Bootcamp
should not be considered a “release from prison.”
Despite the apparent ambiguity of the phrase “release from prison”
in the felony DWI statute, the Heilman court interpreted the phrase
according to the proclaimed plain meaning attached by the court. 236 The
culmination of statutes, cases, and documents above indicate that if the court
had engaged in the necessary statutory interpretation, it would have arrived
at a different conclusion. Namely, the court would have found that when a
person departs for Phase II of Bootcamp, it is not a “release from prison”
within the meaning of the felony DWI Statute.

229
230

Id.
Id. at 412 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR.

div. directive 204.061 (July 26, 2016)).

Id.
See id. (indicating people are “released from prison” under the felony DWI statute when
they depart for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program); see also MINN. STAT.

231
232

§ 645.16 (2019) (directing courts to conduct statutory interpretation with the purpose of
effectuating legislative intent).
Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive 204.060
(July 1, 2019), http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?
Opt=204.060.htm [https://perma.cc/FE39-S2VF].
233

234
235
236

Id.
Id.
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394.
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B. An Equal Protection Danger Posed by the Court’s Incomplete
Statutory Interpretation Analysis in Heilman
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” 237 The Minnesota Constitution’s equal
protection clause similarly provides, “No member of this State shall be
disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” 238
Both clauses are generally analyzed under the same principles, beginning
with the mandate that all similarly situated people must be treated alike. 239
Only “invidious discrimination” is deemed constitutionally offensive. 240
“The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or
other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged.” 241
Furthermore, under both constitutions, equal protection claims not
involving a suspect class or a fundamental right are reviewed under a rational
basis standard. 242
The federal rational basis standard only requires that the challenged
legislation “bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.” 243 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has established “‘a more stringent
standard of review’ than its federal counterpart.” 244 Unlike federal courts,
Minnesota courts are unwilling to hypothesize a possible rational basis to
justify a classification. 245 Instead, Minnesota requires a reasonable
connection between the actual effect of the challenged classification and the
statutory goals. 246
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
MINN. CONST., art. I, § 2.
See State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011); State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 568
(Minn. 1997).
In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963)).
Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981).
See Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, Inc., 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000) (citing
Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 769).
W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981).
In re Durand, 859 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d
886, 889 (Minn. 1991)).
Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
Id. This independent and stricter rational basis review is warranted and necessary for
Minnesota to guarantee equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution, despite the
continually changing federal case law surrounding federal equal protection rights. Id. The
court explained:
To harness interpretation of our state constitutional guarantees of equal
protection to federal standards and shift the meaning of Minnesota’s
constitution every time federal case law changes would undermine the
integrity and independence of our state constitution and degrade the
237
238
239

240

241
242

243
244

245
246
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1. Minnesota’s Equal Protection Standard and Rational Basis Test
To prevail on an equal protection challenge, as a threshold
requirement, the individual challenging the classification has the burden to
show the two classes created by the state action are similarly situated in
relevant respects. 247 This is because “the Equal Protection Clause does not
require that the State treat persons who are differently situated as though
they were the same.” 248
If neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated by
the state action, Minnesota courts will apply the Minnesota rational basis
test. 249 Minnesota’s rational basis test requires that:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the
classification from those excluded must not be manifestly
arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby
providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation
adapted
to
peculiar
conditions
and
needs;
(2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose
of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between
the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed
remedy;
and
(3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can
legitimately attempt to achieve. 250
Above all, the ultimate purpose of the Minnesota rational basis test
is to ensure a reasonable connection exists between the actual effect of the
challenged classification and the actual statutory goals involved. 251 Minnesota
case law illuminates the application of this rule. The first prong of the test—
a genuine and substantial distinction between those inside and outside the
class—requires the state to show more than anecdotal support for the
special role of this court, as the highest court of a sovereign state, to
respond to the needs of Minnesota citizens.

Id.
247

State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2012).

Id. (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).
See Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, Inc., 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000) (citing
In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1986)). A fundamental right is one that
248
249

is “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Fundamental rights are “‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”
Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). Suspect
classifications are defined as “classification[s] based on race, national origin, [or] alienage.”
Suspect Classification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (classifications based on citizenship and alien
status are inherently suspect); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (racial
classifications are constitutionally suspect).
Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
Id. at 889.
250
251
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classification. 252 Rather, some sort of evidence or scientific study should be
provided to justify the classification. 253 The rationale for a classification
cannot be based purely on assumption. 254
The second prong requires a showing that the created classification
is relevant to its asserted purpose. 255 To ascertain if the classification is
relevant, the court can review the statutory objective of the statute and
surrounding statutes. 256 Under the third rational basis prong, “[a]n interest is
generally considered legitimate if it advances one of the state’s traditional
police powers.” 257
Lastly, there is an additional consideration for criminal statutes. A
criminal statute is unconstitutional under the Minnesota Equal Protection
Clause if it prescribes different punishments or different degrees of
punishment for the same conduct committed under similar circumstances
by people who are similarly situated. 258 Thus, in order to establish that equal
protection has been denied, an individual must show that similarly situated
people have been punished differently. 259

2. Applying Minnesota’s Rational Basis Test to the Classifications
Created by the Heilman Decision
To demonstrate the potential equal protection violation created by
the court’s decision in Heilman v. Courtney, this section analyzes the
classifications under the Minnesota rational basis standard. The threshold
requirement for equal protection claims is a showing that the two classes
created by the court’s decision are similarly situated in relevant respects. 260
When criminal punishments are at issue, classes are similarly situated if the
criminalized conduct perpetrated by people in both classes is the same. 261
The critical inquiry is whether the elements of the conduct punished in each
252
253

See Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Minn. 2013).
See ACCRA Care, 828 N.W.2d at 474 (“[A] classification failed the first step of the

Minnesota rational-basis test because the classification was not based on studies or
evidence.”); Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889–90 (requiring more than anecdotal evidence for a
genuine and substantial distinction between classifications).
ACCRA Care, 828 N.W.2d at 474 (citing Healthstar Home Health, Inc. v. Jesson, 827
N.W.2d 444, 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)).
See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
See id. at 904–05.
Kelly A. Spencer, Sex Offenders and the City: Ban Orders, Freedom of Movement, and
Doe v. City of Lafayette, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 297, 306 (2002).
State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 331–32 (Minn. 2006).
See Paquin v. Mack, 788 N.W.2d 899, 906 (Minn. 2010).
State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2012).
See State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 522 (Minn. 2011) (indicating equal protection is not
denied by a statute assigning different punishment to a convicted person unless it gives
different punishments for the same crime committed under the same circumstances by
people in similar situations).
254

255
256
257

258
259
260
261
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classification are the same or essentially similar. 262
Here, the Minnesota rational basis test will apply, as Heilman
concerned neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right. 263
Nonetheless, in Heilman, the court created two classifications: Bootcamp
participants convicted of felony-level DWIs and all other persons convicted
of felony-level DWIs. 264 The criminal conduct punished in each class is not
just similar, it is identical. 265 People in both classifications are charged under
the felony DWI statute. 266 The statute requires all people convicted of felony
DWI to serve five years of conditional release after leaving prison. 267 Even
though people can have varying prison sentences and can elect to participate
in incarceration programs, the conditional release term is fixed and applies
evenly to all persons convicted of felony-level DWI. 268 Therefore, the classes
created by the Heilman decision are similarly situated, and the threshold
requirement for an equal protection claim is met.

a. The First Prong of the Rational Basis Test: The Classifications
Must Be Genuine and Substantial, Not Arbitrary
The first prong of the rational basis test requires that “[t]he
distinctions which separate those included within the classification from
those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be
genuine and substantial.” 269 This means the state must show more than
anecdotal support for the classification because the state’s rationale for a
distinction cannot be based purely on assumptions. 270 The Heilman decision
does not satisfy this prong because the court did not consider the potential
classifications created through its decision. As such, the court provided no
evidentiary support for its decision outside of its interpretation of the
statutory language which ignored legislative intent. 271 The result is an
262
263
264

Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 522 (citing State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2002)).
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
See Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019). The Heilman court creates

this distinction because Bootcamp participants begin their conditional release when they
depart for Phase II of Bootcamp, while people who do not participate in Bootcamp will not
begin their conditional release term until the completion of their minimum term of
imprisonment. Id. at 394.
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(a), (d) (2019) (mandating a minimum five-year
conditional release term for people sentenced with a felony DWI).
See id.; Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394 (determining that people who leave prison as part
of the Challenge Incarceration Program are released from prison under the felony DWI
statute).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.276.
265

266

267
268
269
270
271

Id.

State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991).

See id.
See Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394; see also Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
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arbitrary classification between two groups of people convicted of felonylevel DWI, which does not meet the first prong of the rational basis test. 272
Even if Bootcamp participants could be considered distinct from
all other people convicted of felony-level DWI because they elect to
participate in an incarceration program, they are not sufficiently
distinguishable from Work Release participants. Nevertheless, Work
Release participants are not afforded the same privilege of beginning
conditional release early when they depart from the prison to participate in
Work Release. 273 This is problematic because, as explained earlier,
Bootcamp and Work Release are both optional, community-based
incarceration programs with similar requirements and operational program
guidelines. 274 This makes the court’s decision irrational and unsupported by
any substantial differences between Bootcamp and Work Release,
indicating that the first prong of the rational basis test is not met.
The critical inquiry in validating class distinctions is whether the
elements of the conduct punished in each classification are the same or
essentially similar. 275 Mandated conditional release applies to all persons
sentenced for felony-level DWI after completion of the term of
imprisonment despite varying lengths in prison sentences. 276 Thus, the
decision a person makes once incarcerated, such as participating in an
incarceration program, should not have any effect on felony DWI
conditional release because it should apply identically to all people
convicted of felony-level DWI. 277 Therefore, the court’s decision in
See Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Minn. 2013) (indicating that a
classification based on anecdotal observations of one expert witness, rather than studies or
evidence, does not pass the first prong of Minnesota’s rational basis test); Russell, 477
N.W.2d at 888–90 (holding that a statute failed the first prong of Minnesota’s rational basis
test because there was a lack of a substantial distinction between those inside and outside of
the class and the only support provided for the classification was purely anecdotal testimony).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy, 903 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)
(indicating people convicted of felony DWI are not “released from prison” under section
169A.276 of the Minnesota Statutes when they depart prison for Work Release); State ex
rel. Weyaus v. Roy, No. A17-1082, 2017 WL 4478229, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2017)
(reaffirming that when a participant leaves prison to participate in Work Release, they are
not “released from prison” under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.276).
See discussion supra Section II.B.
See State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 331 (Minn. 2006) (finding that classifications did
not violate equal protection because the two statutes in question “punish very different
conduct”); State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2002) (“A statute violates the equal
protection clause when it prescribes different punishments or different degrees of
punishment for the same conduct committed under the same circumstances by persons
similarly situated. Thus, the critical inquiry is whether the elements [the] statute[s] are the
same or essentially similar.” (internal citations omitted)).
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.276 (2019).
See id. (providing a sentencing structure for all persons convicted of felony-level DWI,
specifically that all persons must serve a five-year conditional release term if their prison
272

273

274
275

276
277
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Heilman does not satisfy the first prong of the rational basis test as the
distinctions created are manifestly arbitrary and unsupported by evidence.

sentence is executed); State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 522 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that
statutes can violate equal protection when they punish people differently despite the fact that
they punish identical conduct). But see Frazier, 649 N.W.2d at 837 (concluding a statute did
not violate equal protection because the people being punished in each class were not
similarly situated).
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b. The Second Prong of the Rational Basis Test: An Evident
Connection Between the Classification and the Law
The second prong of the rational basis test requires classifications
to be “genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law.” 278 To ascertain if the
classification is relevant, the objective of the statute and surrounding statutes
should be examined. 279 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines indicate that
the purpose of the guidelines “is to establish rational and consistent
sentencing standards that promote public safety, reduce sentencing
disparity, and ensure that the sanctions imposed for felony convictions are
proportional to the severity of the conviction offense and the offender’s
criminal history.” 280 Additionally, conditional release statutes are created to
provide people convicted of certain offenses with close supervision for a
fixed term by the Commissioner of Corrections after release from prison. 281
The court’s decision in Heilman effectively ignores the legislative
purpose for both the Sentencing Guidelines and the felony DWI
conditional release statute because it creates both disparity and
unpredictability in sentencing. Disparity and unpredictability are an
inescapable result when one class of people can begin conditional release
earlier than similarly situated others. Bootcamp participants can begin their
conditional release between seven 282 and fifty 283 months earlier than all other
people convicted of felony DWI. Thus, the second prong of the rational
basis test is not met as the classifications created in Heilman do not have a
genuine or relevant connection to the purposes behind criminal sentencing
guidelines or conditional release statutes. 284

278
279
280
281

Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904–05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 175.
See Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (specifically referencing

the conditional release statute contained in section 609.109, subdivision 7(b), of the 1998
Minnesota Statutes; however, the concepts apply to conditional release generally).
The minimum of seven months comes from the requirement that participants have a
minimum of thirteen months left on their sentence to participate in Bootcamp. This,
combined with the required six months in Phase I, allows participants to leave for Phase II
seven months before their release date. See Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 404
(attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. div. directive
204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).
The maximum of fifty months is derived from the statutory maximum sentence of seven
years for first-degree DWI, meaning a person would serve a minimum term of imprisonment
of fifty-six months. MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.24, subdiv. 2, 244.05, subdiv. 1b (2019). Thus,
incarcerated people who become involved in Bootcamp immediately could complete Phase
I and release to Phase II with fifty months remaining in their sentence. See Heilman, 926
N.W.2d at 404 (attaching Policies, Directives and Instructions Manual, MINN. DEP’T OF
CORR. div. directive 204.060 (Nov. 7, 2017)).
See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991).
282

283

284
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c. The Third Prong of the Rational Basis Test: A Legitimate State
Interest
The third prong of the Minnesota rational basis test requires the
purpose behind the classification to be related to a legitimate state interest. 285
“An interest is generally considered legitimate if it advances one of the state’s
traditional police powers.” 286 Determining what conduct to criminalize and
what punishments to attach clearly falls within a state’s traditional police
powers because it is within the powers of “a sovereign to make all laws
necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality,
and justice.” 287 In this case, the third prong of the rational basis test is likely
satisfied because the statute involved is a statute punishing criminal conduct,
through which the state legitimately exercises its traditional police power to
determine what conduct to criminalize. 288

d. The Overall Purpose of the Rational Basis Test: A Reasonable
Connection Between the Actual Effect of a Classification and
the Purpose of the Classification
The ultimate purpose of the Minnesota rational basis test is to
ensure a reasonable connection exists between the actual effect of the
challenged classification and the statutory goals involved. 289 The purpose
behind the felony DWI statute is to ensure people remain supervised in the
community for a fixed period after completing their term of imprisonment
so as to smooth their transition back into society after incarceration. 290 The
legislature also intended criminal sentences to be promulgated in a fair,
consistent, and equitable manner to reduce disparity. 291
The decision in Heilman creates a circumstance where similarly
situated people receive disparate sentences because Bootcamp participants
can begin their conditional release significantly earlier than people who do
not participate in Bootcamp. 292 Bootcamp participants may serve less of their
285
286
287
288

See Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
Spencer, supra note 257.
Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See ACCRA Care, 828 N.W.2d at 476 (“The third step of Minnesota’s rational-basis test

is to analyze whether the purpose of the amendment is “one that the state can legitimately
attempt to achieve.”); Spencer, supra note 257 (indicating a state’s purpose is usually
legitimate if it relates to the state’s police powers or interests).
Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
See Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining the purposes
behind conditional release); see also supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019)
(indicating the Sentencing Guidelines are meant to establish rational and consistent
sentencing standard that reduce disparity).
See id. (indicating the intent that there be rational and consistent sentencing standards
which promote public safety while reducing sentencing disparities); Heilman v. Courtney,
289
290

291

292
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conditional release term in the community than other people convicted of
felony DWI because some of their conditional release time is expended
during their time participating in Phases II and III of Bootcamp. 293 As such,
the court’s decision in Heilman undercuts the legitimate state and legislative
purposes for conditional release and criminal sentencing guidelines,
creating a circumstance where the state’s purposes are not achieved. The
classifications created by the court’s decision in Heilman are not reasonably
related to the purpose of the statutes and, therefore, fail to satisfy the rational
basis test. 294
In short, the classifications created by the Heilman decision would not
satisfy the requirements of the Minnesota rational basis test because the
classifications drawn in Heilman were arbitrary and did not genuinely or
appropriately relate to the legitimate legislative purpose behind the felony DWI
conditional release statute or the Sentencing Guidelines. Overall, the Minnesota
rational basis test is not satisfied because the classifications do not reasonably relate
to the actual legislative intent behind the felony DWI statute and the Sentencing
Guidelines.
295

296

V. CONCLUSION
The Heilman court interpreted “released from prison” in a manner
inconsistent with legislative intent, case history, and administrative guidelines. Had
the court undertaken a comprehensive statutory interpretation, it would have
determined that the phrase “release from prison” is ambiguous and refers to a
person’s release from a term of imprisonment. Thus, participants’ departure for
Phase II of Bootcamp cannot constitute a “release from prison” unless they have
completed their mandated minimum term of imprisonment. Furthermore, the
Heilman decision violates equal protection by allowing people who are similarly
situated to be treated differently without a rational basis for such disparate
treatment.

926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019) (holding that persons convicted of felony DWI who
depart from prison for Phase II of the Challenge Incarceration Program are “released from
prison” for the purpose of triggering their conditional release, and noting that this decision
does not apply to Work Release participants).
Heilman, 926 N.W.2d at 394.
See Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 281 (Minn. 1981) (holding a statute
and resulting classifications unconstitutional because classifications rested on grounds that
were purely arbitrary).
See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (providing that a classification
must be genuine or relevant to a given law’s purpose to pass Minnesota’s rational basis test).
See id. at 889 (concluding that the overall purpose of Minnesota’s rational basis test is to
ensure a reasonable connection exists between the actual effect of the challenged
classification and the statutory goals involved).
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